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resumo: Este artigo compara e contrasta dois conceitos filosóficos pro-
venientes de distintas linhagens de pensamento: de um lado, o clinamen 
de Lucrécio; do outro, o conatus de Espinosa. O que fomentou minha 
pesquisa foi uma conjugação dessas noções tal como proposta por De-
leuze no apêndice de seu Logique du sens. Nesse sentido, a primeira seção 
está orientada tendo em vista uma elucidação da filosofia de Lucrécio 
– consequentemente, também a de Epicuro – e, especificamente, uma 
interpretação do desvio dos átomos ou clinamen em combinação com o 
tópico da liberdade. A segunda seção se dedica a clarificar a metafísica 
de Espinosa e a acomodação do tema da liberdade dentro de seu robusto 
enquadramento necessitarista, entrelaçado com o motivo do conatus ou 
esforço de auto-preservação. Contra a leitura de Deleuze, entretanto, ar-
gumentarei que clinamen e conatus pertencem a sistemas metafísicos que 
são praticamente incompatíveis e que corroboram um entendimento 
diferente sobre liberdade e necessidade. 
palavras-chave: Lucrécio, Espinosa, clinamen, conatus; liberdade, neces 
-sidade 
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introduction
In this paper, I juxtapose Lucretius’ principle of clinamen and 
Spinoza’s doctrine of conatus, with the aim of clarifying the interplay 
between freedom and necessity in the philosophy of each thinker. In 
brief, clinamen is the atomic swerve introduced by Epicurus into the ma-
terialist physics of Democritus and Leucippus and conatus is the striving 
to persevere in existence that Spinoza identifies with the actual essence 
of each being. I believe that by bringing these authors together – collat-
ing and contrasting the underlying assumptions that both clinamen and 
conatus entail – we might gain further insight on the distinctiveness of 
some features of their theory, just as chemical reagents, when placed to-
gether, allow for the observer to examine, discriminate and understand 
the specificity of each substance at issue in the experiment.
First of all, it should be noted that an approach to Lucretius – the 
Roman poet and intellectual of Epicurean inspiration from the 1st cen-
tury b.c. – and Spinoza – the rationalist philosopher of Jewish-Dutch 
origin from the 17th century a.d. – could have explored equally legiti-
mate and fruitful routes other than the one that I am proposing. On the 
one hand, one could have investigated their philosophical affinities, such 
as their shared commitment to a form of rationalism cum naturalism, the 
objection to teleology as an explanatory grid of the way of the world, or 
the criticism against prevailing religious beliefs and superstitious prac-
tices.1 On the other hand, one could have stressed their contrast, such as 
1  As in Morfino’s study, for instance, which pursues the red thread that connects 
Lucretius and Spinoza: “Fear and superstition are the common enemies of Lucretius 
and Spinoza. Against them both pleaded the cause of the knowledge of nature based 
on two fundamental points: the rejection of every finalist model of explanation of 
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Lucretius’ atomistic dualism – atoms and void; primordial elements and 
empty space – and Spinoza’s substance monism – Deus, sive substantia 
constans infinitis attributis (cf. spinoza, 1985, iP112) – their irreconcilable 
views on the divine – transcendent and apathetic gods, on Lucretius’ 
case, God as the immanent cause of all things, on Spinoza’s – or still the 
very form of their work – a philosophical poem as De Rerum Natura fol-
lowing the trail of Parmenides, Xenophanes and Empedocles, contrary 
to the geometrical method from the Ethics echoing Euclid’s Elements.
An incidental remark made by Deleuze in the first appendix to 
his Logique du sens brought my attention to the relation between the slight 
deviation from the trajectory of the atom or clinamen and the striving to 
preserve in existence or conatus. When explaining the workings of the clin-
amen, Deleuze conflates it with the Spinozian conatus. In brief, he argues 
that the clinamen is “a kind of conatus”3; this correspondence was later 
explored by other authors. The analogy motivated my research for this 
paper. Pace Deleuze, however, I argue that clinamen and conatus stand in an 
almost diametric position and support conflicting philosophical views. 
natural phenomena and the affirmation of the existence of natural laws that regulate 
becoming.” (morfino, 2014, p.75). I will say more on Morfino’s interpretation later on. 
2  For the works of Spinoza, I have consulted the two-volume edition of The Col-
lected Writings of Spinoza translated by Edwin Curley. For the Latin text I have consult-
ed Bruder’s edition (1843), the Benedicti de Spinoza Opera quae supersunt omnia. 
3  The full passage reads as follows: “The clinamen or swerve has nothing to do with 
an oblique movement which would come accidentally to modify a vertical fall. It has 
always been present: it is not a secondary movement, nor a secondary determination of 
the movement, which would be produced at any time, at any place. The clinamen is the 
original determination of the direction of the movement of the atom. It is a kind of 
conatus — a differential matter and, by the same token, a differential of thought, based 
on the method of exhaustion” (deleuze, 1990, p.269). 
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The conflation between clinamen and conatus was later fol-
lowed by Laurent Bove (cf. bove, 1994) and Warren Montag (cf. mon-
tag, 2016). Contra Montag, I do not believe that this conceptual analogy 
that Deleuze carves out “is at least as illuminating for Spinoza as for 
Lucretius” (montag, 2016, p.170). In fact, I believe that it is exactly the 
opposite. Putting these concepts together obfuscate our comprehen-
sion of the specificity that each of them brings, as well as the function 
that each performs within their respective philosophical system. Perhaps 
Nietzsche is right, sometimes mediating between two thinkers, equaliz-
ing their thoughts, may prevent– rather than illuminate – the apprecia-
tion of the singularity that each philosophy embodies (nietzsche, 1974, 
p.212).4
I am well aware that these particular concepts associated with 
each thinker (clinamen with Epicurus/Lucretius; conatus with Spinoza) 
have sparked a wide-ranging, highly controversial academic debate over 
time. Nevertheless, I consider that in making this contradistinction, 
some fresh light may be shed on the purport and implications of each 
theoretical notion. 
With that said, I start off the first section of the paper by de-
lineating the framework of Epicurean philosophy to which the notion 
of the clinamen belongs. Then, I provide an exegesis of the verses from 
De Rerum Natura which contains an explanation of the motion of the 
swerve. I demonstrate that, in spite of the variety of conflicting readings 
of the swerve and the libera voluntas, it is possible to grasp a common 
denominator: a break in the chains of necessity, with an affirmation of 
4  Certainly, Nietzsche employs much harsher words than my paraphrase of his 
aphorism reveals.
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some sort of agency against the menace of fatalism. 
In the second section, I move to Spinoza and elaborate on his 
conatus doctrine within the structure of his metaphysics. I begin by ex-
pounding on his criticisms against predominant ideas of “freedom” and 
then examine the relationship between conatus, necessity, and some ex-
pression of “free” action amidst Spinoza’s robust necessitarianism.  
In the end, I show that Lucretius and Spinoza set up the problem 
of freedom and necessity in entirely different theoretical frameworks, 
such that clinamen and conatus are deeply geared into the metaphysical 
apparatus of each author. In this respect, I conclude that clinamen and 
conatus come forth almost to the point of incommensurability to one 
another. 
epicurus and lucretius: on CLINAMEN, LIBERA VOLUNTAS and agency 
In the Epicurean school, the clinamen is conceived as a physical 
rationale to defend a space for human agency where moral account-
ability, rational deliberation and justified praise and blame made sense. 
Accordingly, it seeks to establish a firm foothold against the risk of fatal-
ism that a deterministic or even necessitarian metaphysical framework 
could generate. Throughout the paper, I consider fatalism as a subjective 
attitude of indifference or torpidity that is the outcome of a determinist 
or necessitarian metaphysical picture of the world. Whereas determin-
ism claims that given certain antecedent conditions, a set of subsequent 
conditions will necessarily follow, while maintaining, at the same time, 
that the antecedent conditions are not a necessary truth, necessitarianism 
is a much stronger thesis given that it maintains that all truths are nec-
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essary truths, so that the actual chain of causes is logically necessary (the 
antecedents as well as the consequences), to the point that an alternative 
series of events is, in principle, impossible.
With that said, an analysis of the theory of clinamen (παρέγκλισις) 
must at first confront the fact that we do not find any mention of it in 
Epicurus’ extant writings. Nonetheless, references from different sourc-
es attribute to him the hypothesis of the swerve as an innovative feature 
appended to his atomist doctrine. It is usually thought that the swerve 
is a novelty that Epicurus introduces to eschew the deterministic impli-
cation that Democritus’ physics might bring about. This is the account 
that one encounters both in the Epicurean Diogenes of Oenoanda (c. 
2nd century a.d.) and in the work of an author mostly critical to Epi-
cureanism such as Cicero (106-43 b.c.).5 Lucretius’ argument for the 
existence of the swerve in Book ii from De Rerum Natura is another 
chapter in this story; indeed, a very important one, for it presents the 
most extensive and elaborate account of the swerve of atoms. 
Thus, it is written in one of the surviving inscriptions from Dio-
genes of Oenoanda: 
Once prophecy is eliminated, how can there be any other evi-
dence for fate? For if someone uses Democritus’ account, saying 
that because of their collisions with each other atoms have no 
free movement and that as a result it appears that all motions are 
necessitated, we will reply to him: ‘Don’t you know, whoever you 
are, that there is also a free movement in atoms [ελευθεραν τινά 
εν ταΐς άτόμοις κείνησιν], which Democritus failed to discover 
but Epicurus brought to light, a swerving movement, as he dem-
5  Further references to the clinamen and Epicurus are found in Plotinus, Enneads 
iii.1, 1, 14-29; Plutarch, Moralia, 1015 c, 1045 b-c, 1050 b-c 9, among others. 
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onstrates from evident facts?’ But the chief point is this: if fate 
is believed in, that is the end of all censure and admonition and 
even the wicked (fr. 32, 1.14-3.14; long and sedley, 1987, vol. 1, 
p.106, 20G).6
In turn, in Cicero’s De Fato one reads: 
(21) At this initial stage, if I were disposed to agree with Epicurus 
and to deny that every proposition is either true or false, I would 
rather accept that blow than allow that all things happen through 
fate. For the former view is at least arguable, whereas the latter is 
truly intolerable. Chrysippus, then, strains every nerve to persuade 
us that every axioma (proposition) is either true or false. For just as 
Epicurus is afraid that if he admits this he will have to admit that 
all events happen through fate – for if one of the two has been 
true from all eternity it is certain and if certain then necessary 
too, which he considers enough to prove both necessity and fate 
–so too Chrysippus fears that if he fails to secure the result that 
every proposition is either true or false he cannot maintain that 
everything happens through fate and from eternal causes of future 
events. (22) But Epicurus thinks that the necessity of fate is avoid-
ed by the swerve of atoms [declinatione atomi] … (23) Epicurus’ 
reason for introducing this theory was his fear that, if the atom’s 
motion was always the result of natural and necessary weight, we 
would have no freedom [nihil liberum nobis esset], since the mind 
would be moved in whatever way it was compelled by the mo-
tion of atoms. Democritus, the originator of atoms, preferred to 
accept this consequence that everything happens through neces-
sity than to rob the atomic bodies of their natural motions (De 
Fato, 21-3; long and sedley, 1987, vol.1, pp.104-5, 20E).7
6  All references from classical texts were extracted from the collection The Helle-
nistic Philosophers organized by Long and Sedley. In this case, I offer the original source 
of the quote, together with the text number, and subsection from their volume, as 
follows: “[original reference]; long and sedley, 1987, volume, page, <text number with 
subsection>.”
7  As I will have the opportunity to indicate below, Diogenes of Oenoanda’s cita-
tion presents us with an instance of causal determinism while Cicero’s gives us a case 
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Without explicitly mentioning the swerve of the atoms, it is 
possible to locate in Epicurus’ philosophy this strong contention against 
the realm of fate and the rule of necessity as an overpowering force gov-
erning all events in human life. In a passage from the Letter to Menoeceus 
(133-4; long and sedley, 1987, vol.1, p.102, 20a), Epicurus claims that 
it would be better to believe in the traditional mythology about the 
gods than to believe in the authority of fate from the “natural philoso-
phers” [τώνφνσικών]. For regarding the former, at least there is a hope 
of turning the gods to one’s favor by means of offerings and worship, 
while with the latter not even this alternative is granted, as one becomes 
a “slave of fate”8 [ειμαρμένη δουλευει].
For this reason, Epicurus differentiated between (i) things that 
happen according to necessity [κατ ‘ ανάγκην]; (ii) things that happen 
by chance [άπό τύχης]; and (iii) things that depend on us [παρ’ήμάς] to 
happen. In nuce, necessity is the sphere of the inexorable, thus beyond 
our control (e.g., a hereditary disease or a past event9). Chance is the 
sphere of the unpredictable, thus extremely complicated to control (e.g., 
a lightning bolt that suddenly strikes the mast of a ship). Finally, what 
depends on us is the sphere where human agency intervenes and ratio-
nal deliberation is called for.
of logical determinism. 
8  Furley argues that in this criticism Epicurus has in mind successors of the atomist 
school of Democritus such as Nausiphantes. (cf. furley, 1967, pp.174-5). It is against 
the determinist upshots of atomist’s physics, as well as the absolute govern of fate from 
the Stoics, that the theory of clinamen appears to have been carved out. 
9  As Aristotle argued, and Epicurus seems to have taken into account, it is impos-
sible to rationally deliberate and take a stand in what is absolutely necessary, such as 
mathematical truths, past events, and the celestial motion of the superlunary bodies. 
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Epicurus was concerned in affirming this separation and safe-
guarding a domain where human action and rational deliberation made 
sense, instead of handing over to the realm of necessity or even chance 
the entirety of events that occur in human life. Besides orthodox atom-
ism, it is a standpoint predominant in the School of the Stoics that he 
was challenging directly. As an illustration, Zeno and Chrysippus are 
said to have compared the working of fate with the image of a dog tied 
to a moving cart: whether willingly or unwillingly (volens, nolens), the 
dog would necessarily go after the cart.10 Beyond philosophical quar-
rels, this kind of perception also permeated certain aspects of Greek 
spirituality more broadly. One need only to recall Cassandra predicting 
the Fall of Troy and Oedipus fulfilling the prophecy from the Oracle of 
Delphi as he most resolutely strived to escape it. 
We need to distinguish, however, between two types of necessity 
that Epicurus is grappling with. The clinamen will turn out to be a form 
of answering to the empire of necessity and its embodiment in a fatalist 
attitude. On the one side, there is causal determinism as a theory about phys-
ical causation which claims that every event is exhaustively necessitated 
by antecedent conditions that provide necessary and sufficient causes 
for it occurring the way it does and not otherwise. We are familiar with 
this kind of causal determinism through the divine, all-comprehensive 
Stoic Lógos that governs the world like a providential plan of intercon-
nected causal events and through Newtonian physics with its natural 
10  “When a dog is tied to a cart, if it wants to follow it is pulled and follows, making 
its spontaneous act coincide with necessity, but if it does not want to follow it will be 
compelled in any case. So it is with men too: even if they do not want to, they will be 
compelled in any case to follow what is destined.” (hippolytus, Refutation of all heresies 
1.21; long and sedley, 1987, vol.2, p.382, 62a)
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laws giving way to an intransigent mechanical causal chain.11 Basically, 
we have the world apprehended as the manifestation of a divine design 
or the output of a mechanical machine. In both cases, each event that 
takes place is necessitated by a precedent efficient cause, which in turn 
will be the cause of some further event, with this overdetermined causal 
networks stretching back to the Divine Mind and its Lógos or to the 
Natural Law and its Nómos.
 On the other side, there is logical determinism as a theory about 
logical consequence. It is associated with the principle of bivalence when 
applied to statement about the future, that is, the claim that the only 
logically valid truth-value assigned to a proposition is (a) necessarily 
true or (b) necessarily false, while maintaining that this also holds for 
statements about the future.12 This was an important principle in Stoic 
logic and the Megarian/Dialectical School of the logician Diodorus 
Cronus also took it into account in the earliest development of modal 
logic in Antiquity (cf. sedley,1977). In a cultural setting in which ora-
cles and omens had an established place and status, it is at least under-
standable why this form of logical analysis of propositions has risen. 
11  Chrysippus asserted that fate is “a certain everlasting ordering of the whole: one 
set of things follows on and succeeds another and the interconnexion is inviolable.” 
(aulus gellius, Noctus Atticae, 7.2.3; long and sedley, 1987, vol.1, p.297, 50k.). For a 
well-argued, methodical account of fate and freedom within the Stoic School, see 
O’Keefe, 2017.  
12  As reported by Cicero: “Chrysippus uses the following argument: if there is mo-
tion without a cause, not every proposition (what the dialecticians call axioma) will be 
either true or false, since anything lacking efficient causes will be neither true nor false. 
But every proposition is either true or false. Therefore, there is no motion without a 
cause. If this is so, everything that happens, happens through antecedent causes – in 
which case, everything happens through fate. The result is that everything happens 
through fate. (cicero, On fate, 20-1; long and sedley, 1987, vol.1, p.233, 38g). 
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Given this, I would claim that causal determinism presents us 
with a problem of overdetermination (everything is determined due to a 
complex causal chain that renders every event the necessary outcome 
of precedent events) and that logical determinism presents us with a 
problem of predetermination (everything is determined because prop-
ositions about the future must be necessarily true or necessarily false; 
as if the future was necessarily fixed). Despite the distinction we have 
drawn, it is important to recognize that both forms of determinism are 
intermingled for Epicurus and the Stoics, as they seem to be recipro-
cally entailing.
Epicurus rejects the absolute rule of determinism.13 For one, in 
an overly deterministic mechanical system or an already predetermined 
divine economy, there would be no justification for moral accountabil-
ity, i.e., no reason to praise virtuous deeds and blame vicious misdeeds. 
Moreover, an overriding empire of necessity could eventually render 
action meaningless with the threat of “actionlessness” (apraxia), as the 
‘lazy’ or ‘idle’ argument portrays.14 Epicurus claims that it would be 
13  “Epicurus saw the threat of universal necessitation not only in unbreakable 
chains of physical causation, but also in the logical principle of bivalence according 
to which every proposition is either true or false, including those about the future… 
But Epicurus, like the Stoic with whom he is contrasted … saw physical and logical 
determinism as two aspects of a single thesis. The two formulations of determinism 
tend to be treated as interchangeable, as do the two respective solutions, the swerve 
and the denial of bivalence … This conflation seems to rest on the assumed equiva-
lence of ‘true in advance’ with ‘determined by pre-existing causes’’’ (long and sedley, 
1987, vol.1, p.111-2). 
14  Cicero’s example is very instructive. Suppose somebody is fated to recover from a 
given disease. If this is the case which has already been established by fate, why bother 
calling the doctor, and taking the proper medicine to get healed? Likewise, if it has 
already been fated that somebody will die from a disease, what would motivate his 
action to try to overcome it? If so, then it is equally futile to call a doctor and take the 
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unacceptable also on “pragmatic grounds” for someone to hold the be-
lief that everything occurs by the force of necessity and consistently act 
based upon this belief. This is the line of argument that the surviving 
fragments from what has been established as book 25 from his major 
work On Nature offer us (cf. sedley, 1983; sedley, 1988; o’keefe, 2005, 
p.131-4).
For these reasons, Epicurus has been hailed for having discov-
ered the freedom of the will, with the swerve of the atoms being closely 
connected with it (cf. huby, 1967). In Sedley and Long, we also find this 
strand of reading: “Thus posing the problem of determinism he becomes 
arguably the first philosopher to recognize the philosophical centrality 
of what we know as the Free Will Question.” (long and sedley, 1987, 
vol.1,p.107). In consonance with this, the swerve is traditionally con-
strued as introducing a minimum degree of physical indeterminism that 
hinders volitions of becoming fully explicable in terms of the laws of 
physics and the causal network of atoms. In a well-known piece, Sedley 
draws a parallel between Epicurus’ reworked atomism and Heisenberg’s 
Uncertainty Principle, taking the clinamen to stand for the element of 
indeterminacy which occurs in a subatomic level as demonstrated by 
modern quantum physics (cf. sedley, 1983, p.12). Anticipating the com-
parison a bit, one can see that this alone would immediately clash with 
medication. As Cicero declares, if we accept this fatalist argument that everything is 
already decided and inescapably determined from eternity, then “we would do noth-
ing whatever in life” (cicero, On fate, 28-30; long and sedley, 1987, vol.1, p.339, 55s). 
The Stoics had a clever approach to deflect the lazy argument by claiming that certain 
events are “co-fated.” In this respect, God would have fated the consequent result as 
well as my causally effective antecedent action. In the example under consideration, 
both the activity of calling the doctor, and ingesting the medicine, as well as the after-
math of recovering health would be “co-fated.” See o’keefe, 2017. 
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Spinoza’s metaphysics in the Ethics, for “a thing which has been deter-
mined by God to produce an effect, cannot render itself undetermined” 
(cf. spinoza, 1996, p.19, iP27, conjoined with a3).
Naturally, this interpretation of the clinamen is far from being 
unanimous. There has been much debate on both the “discovery” of the 
free-will problem in Antiquity15 and on the role that the swerve should 
perform to ensure that agency is preserved.16 In what follows, I will 
turn my attention to Lucretius’ text and I will attempt to bring together 
the divergent interpretation of the clinamen in an integrated and general 
direction.
It is in Book ii of De Rerum Natura that Lucretius exposes the 
theory of clinamen. In a first argument (216-50), he advances the cos-
mogonic function of the swerve to justify the collision of atoms and, 
consequently, the composition of the world. It has been argued that the 
swerve as the third sort of motion – besides the motion due to pondus 
(or weight) and plagae (or blows) that comes out of the shock between 
atoms – was an attempt that Epicurus undertook to evade Aristotle’s 
criticism of Democritus’ atomist doctrine (cf. fowler, 2002, p.118-20). 
In a second section (251-93), the clinamen plays a role in psychology, as 
it endeavors to explicate somehow why animated beings can act volun-
tarily. According to Fowler, the cosmological and the psychological do-
mains in which the swerve operates are intertwined, for “Both explain 
how change enters a universe which would otherwise be changeless” 
(fowler, 2002, p.307).
15  For instance: bobzien, 1998; bobzien 2000; o’keefe, 2005; frede, 2011. 
16  See gulley, 2010; fowler, 1983; fowler, 2002; englert, 1987; furley, 1967; avo-
tins, 1980; saunders, 1984.
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In the light of Fowler’s reconstruction of the argument, the clin-
amen is presupposed at the atomic level as a physical rationale for the 
macroscopic phenomenon of the libera voluntas that is apparent in the 
self-initiating action of animated creatures. As Lucretius famously wrote: 
“Nothing can come into being out of nothing” [ii.287; long and sed-
ley, 1987, vol.1, p.106, 20f]. Therefore, as voluntas manifestly exist and as 
the volitional aptitude that drives humans in one direction or the other 
cannot be fully explicated vis-à-vis the ‘internal necessity’ of the weight 
that drags the atoms downwards or the external force of collision that 
throws them around, there has to be a self-propelling movement at the 
microscopic-atomic level that accounts for libera voluntas. This atomic 
motion is the clinamen.  
As it has already been observed, the general form of the argu-
ment is the oft-employed Modus TollendoTollens (If p, then q; but not 
q; therefore, not p) that Lucretius relies on heavily in the first two books 
and which is also relevant for Epicurus’ reasoning. In this case: (p1) If 
there is no clinamen, there would be no libera voluntas; (p2) But there is 
libera voluntas; (Conclusion) Therefore, the clinamen must exist.17 The 
argument moves from the perceptible domain where voluntas can be 
seen as a principle of motion to the atomic level where the swerve is 
taken to be a source of movement as well. As Sedley nicely puts it: “The 
existence of psychological autonomy is his premises, the existence of 
the swerve his conclusion.” (sedley, 1983, p.14). The voluntas, in this 
instance, is a form of intentional power that allows agents to initiate 
motion and thus become causally effective in the world in the pursuit 
of their desires. 
17  A reconstitution drawn from (O’Keefe, 2005, p.28-9) and (Fowler, 2002, p.323). 
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So, let us take a look at what the text from De Rerum Natura 
states: 
Moreover, if all motion is always linked and new motion arises 
out of old in a fixed order and atoms do not by swerving make 
some beginning motion to break the decrees of fate, so that cause 
should not follow cause from infinity [ex infinito], from where 
does this free volition [libera…] exist for animals throughout the 
world? From where, I ask, comes this volition wrested away from 
the fates [fatis a volsa voluntas], through which we proceed wher-
ever each of us is led by his pleasure and likewise swerve off 
[declinamus] our motions at no fixed time or fixed region of space 
[nec tempore certo nec regione loci certa], but wherever the mind itself 
carries us? For without doubt it is volition [voluntas] that gives 
these things their beginning for each of us and it is from volition 
that motions are spread through the limbs (ii.251-62; long and 
sedley, 1987, vol.1, pp.105-6, 20f)
The interpretation of this argument is disputable. The exact re-
lation between clinamen and voluntas is still widely debatable. Likewise, 
there is no harmonious reading of the similes Lucretius employs to 
somehow elucidate his view such as that of the horse running through 
the gates once they are opened (ii.261-71), and of the man who resists 
an external coercive action (ii.272-283). This equivocation bears upon, 
before all else, the translation of the term “libera voluntas.” Should it be 
rendered qua “free will,” as the traditional interpretation defends? Or 
should it be something more akin to “volitional desire” and “inten-
tional impulse” (cf. o’keefe, 2005, p.42)? Apart from this difficulty in 
translation, I argue that the conflicting interpretations seem to share a 
common feature: in a way or another, the clinamen introduces a slight 
discontinuity in a logical/causal chain that would be otherwise fixed; 
in one way or another, therefore, the clinamen implies a certain kind of 
break. This is what the text states explicitly.
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Some commentators claim that the clinamen intervenes in the 
formation of the will (Gulley), while others claim that it is rather in 
the execution of a will which involves effortful activity (Saunders) that 
the clinamen comes into play. Some argue that the clinamen is related to 
the formation of personal character by assuring an interruption with 
the original constitution of soul-atoms (Furley, Bozien). For Sedley, the 
swerve brings about “emergent properties” for the self and its volitions 
which are structurally different than the physical laws of atomic motions. 
O’Keefe argues that the swerve plays no direct part in the production of 
any act of will or the formation of character. In his interpretation, the 
swerve secures the contingency of the future thus denying both logical 
and causal determinism. Overall, it is a certain space for human agency 
to step in that is in question in the different readings, via a discontinu-
ance in the nexus of causes.18
I will not argue which species of freedom Lucretius is interested in 
retaining by virtue of the swerve. For the purposes of this paper, it does 
not carry much weight for the argument either to defend that the libera 
voluntas sanctions a full-fledged libertarian conception of freedom of 
choice – in the form of a freedom to do otherwise or a two-sided potesta-
18  Even in O’Keefe’s “ultra-minimal” interpretation, as he calls it, to oppose it to 
Bozien’s “minimal” account for the swerve in character-formation, but also to distance 
it from traditional readings of the swerve in action-theory, we may find a statement 
such as the following: “Thus, the swerve, by defeating the threat of necessity as posed 
by Megarian fatalist arguments, provides a necessary condition for other things that 
matter within Epicurean ethics – it saves us from the necessity of the physicists, against 
which there is no appeal, it allows us to deliberate and to act efficaciously in the world, which 
would not be possible if all things happened of necessity. Beyond playing these specific, 
though important, functions, the swerve has no impact in Epicurus’ general metaphys-
ics, philosophy of mind, or action -theory” (o’keefe, 2005, p.149, my emphasis). 
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tive understanding of what “depends on us”19 (παρʹ ήμᾰς) – or to endorse 
that it offers us a compatibilist approach of sorts. The important point is 
that the clinamen assures a break in the determinist series (logical, causal 
or both) – the “decrees of fate” [fati foedera] –, thus enabling a space for 
agency that is not the direct output of causes following causes ad infinitum. 
In the traditional interpretation, the swerve breaks the causal 
overdeterministic chain so that “free will” may take place. In the radical 
emergence interpretation, the swerve breaks the reductionism of psy-
chological volitions to physical motions of the atoms. In the internal 
cause interpretation, the swerve breaks the thoroughly external con-
stitution of the agent’s character. In the bivalence interpretation, the 
swerve breaks with logical/causal determinism that freezes the future in 
an eternally predetermined image. In any case, the clinamen is assumed 
to break with a figure of determinism and to avert the threat of fatalism, in 
an effort to make room for moral accountability, efficacious actions, ra-
tional deliberation, and justified praise and blame.20
spinoza: on CONATUS, LIBERA NECESSITATE and necessitarianism
Before touching on the theme of conatus, I believe that it is 
important to formulate, even if succinctly, some of the theoretical con-
cerns and metaphysical strands driving Spinoza’s enterprise in the Ethics, 
especially on the topic of freedom and necessity, since it is not possible 
19  That is, according to Bobzien’s typology (cf. bobzien, 1998; bobzien, 2000). 
20  I am using the nomenclature offered by O’Keefe for the different strands of read-
ings in recent literature concerning the swerve (cf. o’keefe, 2005, p.18). Each interpre-
tation will emphasize a different issue that the swerve intends to preserve. I am setting 
them up together just to indicate what is at stake in the argument for the clinamen. 
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to get the right grasp on the doctrine of conatus before understanding 
the broader philosophical framework where it is inscribed. In this re-
gard, I believe that it is in a letter to Schuller that we find Spinoza’s 
strongest version of this account. 
The context of his response is a comparison made by Tschirn-
haus between Descartes and Spinoza on freedom. In his letter, Tschirn-
haus ultimately sided with Descartes and was asking for some clarifi-
cation on Spinoza’s thoughts on freedom. Accordingly, Spinoza’s words 
– echoing Definition 7 from the first book of the Ethics –, are:
I say that a thing is free if it exists and acts solely from the neces-
sity of its own nature and compelled if it is determined by some-
thing else to exist and produce effects in a fixed and determinate 
way. E.g., even though God exists necessarily, still he exists freely, 
because he exists from the necessity of his own nature alone. 
So God also understands himself and absolutely all things, freely, 
because it follows solely from the necessity of his nature that he 
understands all things.21 You see, then, that I place freedom not 
in a free decree [libero decreto], but in a free necessity [libera neces-
sitate]. (spinoza, 2016, Letter 58, p.427). 
Further in the letter, Spinoza presents a very telling image to 
explain the workings of that “fictitious human freedom” [ficta humana 
libertate] to which most people are so affectionately bound (cf. spinoza, 
2016, p.429). The analogy goes as follows: a stone is set in motion by 
a certain external cause. Even after the immediate stimulus of the ex-
ternal cause ceases, the stone will necessarily continue to move as far 
as the momentum lasts. This momentum, however, was obtained by the 
21  As I intend to show, it is not gratuitous that Spinoza’s paradigmatic instance of 
freedom be God. 
258      Cadernos Espinosanos  São Paulo  n.41  jul-dez  2019
compelled necessity of an external cause, rather than issuing from the free 
necessity of its essence, as it is the case with God – the infinite and eter-
nal substance. Conversely, for all finite things, i.e., things “which are all 
determined by external causes to exist and produce effects in a definite 
and determinate way” (Spinoza, 2016, p.428) the example of the stone 
holds as a rule. 
Spinoza expands on the analogy of the stone, which will be partic-
ularly significant for us since the conatus comes into play with this move. 
Next, conceive now, if you will, that while the stone continues to 
move, it thinks and knows that as far as it can it strives [se, quantum 
potest, conari] to continue moving. Of course, since the stone is 
conscious only of its striving [conatus] and not at all indifferent, it 
will believe that it is very free and that it perseveres in motion for 
no other cause than because it wills to. This is that famous human 
freedom everyone brags about having, which consists only in this: 
that men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the caus-
es by which they are determined (spinoza, 2016, Letter 58, p.428).
This formula (“men are conscious of their appetite and ignorant of the 
causes by which they are determined”) will reappear with some slight 
variations across the Ethics to characterize the illusory idea of freedom 
that Spinoza reproaches (cf. spinoza, 1996, i Appendix; ii P35S; iii P2S; 
iv Preface). 
Furthermore, I think that is not accidental that Spinoza has cho-
sen the image of the stone in motion by an external force to dismiss pre-
vailing conceptions of human freedom. In St. Augustine’s well-known 
De Libero Arbitrio, the downward movement of a stone is employed to 
highlight the contrast between natural and voluntary movement. Along 
with his lines, “the stone does not have it in its power to check the 
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movement by which it is borne in its descent, whereas when the mind 
does not will, it is not moved to take delight in lower things, leav-
ing higher things behind” (augustine, 2010, p.74). The movement of 
a stone is natural and necessary, whereas the movement of the mind is 
voluntary and free. The mind can withhold the natural course and that 
is what renders human beings morally accountable before God. Free 
will, after all, is a “divine gift” (augustine, 2010, p.67). This outlook fits 
into Augustine’s worldview which maintains that a wandering horse is 
better than a stone because it has movement of its own and a human 
being which is endowed with free-will is better than a wandering horse 
that does not possess this grounding cause of both virtue and sin. (cf. 
augustine, 2010, p.84).22
In defiance of this standpoint, Spinoza cannot allow for this hi-
erarchical scale of created beings. This would violate his naturalism, viz. 
the “thesis that everything in the world plays by the same rules,” as Della 
Rocca nicely puts it (della rocca, 2008, p.5). In Spinoza’s lingo, man 
in the realm of nature is not a “dominion within a dominion” [imperi-
um in imperio]; he is not a divine anomaly inhabiting God’s natural and 
necessary world.23 Instead, human beings are subjected to the same 
22  I am aware that this is only a partial and early view of St. Augustine on the 
matter of freedom, which develops with some important modifications throughout 
his later works due to a larger focus on the theological conundrums of original sin, 
divine grace, God’s foreknowledge, predestination, and related topics. For a recent, and 
cogent survey on St. Augustine and the problem of free will, see couenhoven, 2017.
23  “Most of those who have written about the affects, and men’s way of living, 
seems to treat, not of natural things, which follow the common laws of Nature, but 
of things which are outside Nature. Indeed they seem to conceive man in Nature as a 
dominion within a dominion. For they believe that man disturbs, rather than follows, 
the order of Nature, that he has absolute power over his actions, and that he is deter-
mined only by himself ” (spinoza, 1996, p.68, iii Preface). 
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“universal laws and rules of nature” (spinoza, 1996, p. 69, iii Preface) 
that govern everything that happens, i.e., the necessary and natural con-
catenation of causes and effects generated by the immanent God. 
Looking at the passage just cited in the letter, it appears that the 
conatus doctrine is tied to Spinoza’s criticism against the traditional doc-
trine of free will. To put it simply, for Spinoza, the belief in the “freedom 
of the will” amounts to a consciousness of striving [conatus] plus igno-
rance of external causes that triggered the appetite.24Alternatively stat-
ed, the deep-seated conviction on the libera voluntas seems to be bound 
up with a fundamental cognitive blindness concerning the full compass 
of the cosmos’ causal series. But let us first unpack these terms to work 
out their full scope and significance. 
The conatus argument begins with part iii, Proposition 4 “Noth-
ing can be destroyed except through an external cause,” and is fleshed 
out with proposition 6: “Each thing, as far as it can by its own power, 
strives to persevere in its being.” [Unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in 
suo esse perseverare conatur].25 It is worth noting that this proposition 
replicates to some extent Descartes’ first law of nature from his Principia 
Philosophiae (descartes, 1982, p. 59, Part ii, section xxxvii, ): quod un-
aquaeque res, quantum in se est, semper in eodem statu perseveret; sicque quod 
semel movetur, semper moveri pergat.26 In this sense, Edwin Curley, trans-
24 Appetite is nothing more than the striving (conatus) when regarded in relation to 
both mind and body (cf. spinoza, 1996, iii p9Schol).
25  I am much indebted to Don Garrett’s exposition in his “Spinoza’s Conatus Ar-
gument” in my line of reasoning (garrett, 2002). 
26  In English: “The first law of nature: that each thing, as far as is in its power, al-
ways remains in the same state; and that consequently, when it is once moved, it always 
continues to move.” (descartes, 1982, p.59). In turn, Newton’s Law of Inertia from the 
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lator and commentator of Spinoza, notes that in addition to the patent 
Hobbesian ring, the conatus argument has a bearing on the technical 
usage that Descartes made of conatus in his physics, closely linked to the 
principle of inertia that he brought to the fore – more than Galileo and 
Kepler (cf. cohen, 1964, p.133) – as the foundation of modern physics 
(cf. curley, 1998, pp.107-8). That is why Garrett, in his account, will 
associate conatus to what he calls as “existential inertia.”27
Spinoza equates in p7 the conatus of each thing (its ability to 
persevere in its being) with the actual essence of the thing [rei actualem 
essentiam] and claims in p8 that thisperseverance involves an indefinite 
[indefinitum], rather than a finite time. Furthermore, in p9s Spinoza will 
introduce the notorious thesis that we do not strive for something be-
cause we judge it to be good; on the contrary, our striving for something 
just is the cause for it being judged as good. To put it differently, the 
good is not a final cause that lies externally to the finite being that strives 
to attain it; instead, the striving is the efficient cause arising from the ac-
tual essence of the finite being that accounts for the fact of it judging 
something to be good. Indeed, as Spinoza’s contends elsewhere in the 
Ethics: final causes are nothing but appetites (or efficient causes) mistakenly 
Principia Mathematica seem do draw directly from Descartes. Besides, the missing link 
to account for the cryptic phrase “quantum in se est” is probably Lucretius, as Cohen 
demonstrates in his excellent study (cf. cohen, 1964). Even though Cohen does not 
mention Spinoza in the genealogy that he traces, I find that this study is extremely 
resourceful in expanding our understanding of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine. 
27  “Furthermore, since a thing cannot exert any power to destroy itself but does (in-
sofar as it is in itself) exert power to preserve itself, each thing (insofar as it is in itself) 
has some positive tendency–which we might call “existential inertia”–to continue in 
existence. This existential inertia can be understood partly through the thing’s tenden-
cy to preserve itself and partly through its lacking anything in it that could destroy it 
or oppose this tendency.” (garrett, 2002, p.23). 
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taken as primary causes (cf. spinoza, 1996, iv Preface). In the light of the 
adequate knowledge of causality, final causes consist of nothing but a 
trompe-l’oeil, an optical illusion. 
At this point, let us briefly recall another set of propositions that 
sustains the conatus doctrine and which are lurking in the background 
of his explanation. Singular things should be understood as modes by 
which God’s attribute are expressed in a certain and determinate man-
ner (acc. i p25c) and, by the same token, as expressions of God’s power 
(acc. i p34). Likewise, God is the efficient cause both of the essence and 
of the existence of all singular things (acc. i p24 and p25) and each sin-
gular thing has been necessarily determined by the very nature of God 
to produce an effect (acc. i p26). God is the cause of itself and cannot 
fail but to necessarily exist and be in itself – for there is nothing external 
to substance in line with i p8. Finite modes, or affections of the divine 
substance in a determinate state, express God’s power by striving to per-
severe in their being and by becoming – to the degree that they can – a 
causal focus of their own existence and activity. 
Considering this, Garrett’s thesis that singular things should be 
construed as “quasi-substance” (cf. garrett, 2002, pp.17; 28-9; 42) is 
appealing as it explains the conatus doctrine while remaining committed 
to the deep-seated metaphysical underpinnings of Spinoza’s work. As 
such, individual human beings as finite modes should be taken as mere 
approximations to the conceptual and causal self-sufficiency that God 
– the self-caused and self-contained substance which always is in itself – 
enjoys. It is only an approximation because the essence of human beings 
does not encompass the determinate cause or the explanatory reason 
for their existence. In other terms, the being of human beings is not the 
adequate cause of their essential nature (the ‘what it is’ question, essentia) 
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and human beings, when taking in consideration solely in themselves, 
cannot fully explicate the reason for their reality (the ‘that it is’ question, 
existentia). Humans were created by an external cause –since only God 
is the cause of itself (causa sui); otherwise stated: God is the ratio essendi 
and ratio cognoscendi of itself and everything else – and humans will cer-
tainly perish by an external cause (acc. iii p4). 
With this in view, the conatus can be understood as the onto-
logical foundation of each finite mode that exists in nature. The conatus 
bears the affirmation of each individual essence in the common order 
of nature and it renders explicable all of the properties that issue from its 
“proper essence”28 or, differently put, the existence as long as it perse-
veres in its own being. The striving to persevere in its essence is simulta-
neously a striving to preserve in its existence against external causes that 
may destroy it. Since i p24 warns us that “the essence of things produced 
by God does not involve existence,” once the essence of a finite mode 
is produced following from the necessity of God’s nature (or Natura na-
turata in line with i p29s), it asserts its power to be and it simply is this 
very striving to persevere in its being. However, this striving should not 
be read narrowly in the Hobbesian sense as a natural human instinct to-
wards self-preservation, for it also ensures a self-perfecting rule (in step 
with iii P11-P13), an expansion of the mind’s power of thinking and of 
the body’s power of action that is accompanied by joy.29
28  As Garrett puts it, the proper essence comprises “those states or qualities of a 
thing that are jointly sufficient and severally necessary for the thing’s identity as the 
particular thing that it is, and which would therefore be specified in an adequate Spi-
nozistic definition of that thing” (garrett, 2002, p.5).  
29  Curley claims that the passage from self-preservation to the achievement of great-
er perfection or, what is the same, an augment in power of action coupled with joy, is 
Spinoza’s ingenious manner of blending Stoic and Epicurean tenets (cf. curley, 1998, 
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In iii P9, Spinoza argues that if the mind has adequate or inad-
equate ideas, it will nonetheless strive for its own sake to persevere in 
its being, and that the mind is conscious of its striving. As specified by 
Spinoza, being conscious of the striving and ignorant of the causes of 
the striving provides the rationale for the commonly held belief in the 
“free will.” In the demonstration for this proposition, he explains that 
the striving, when considered only in relation to the mind, is called Will 
and when related to the mind as well as the body it is called Appetite.
Spinoza had previously asserted in i p32 that the will [voluntas] 
cannot be called a free cause [causa libera], but only a necessary one 
[necessaria], considering that “each volition can neither exist nor be de-
termined to produce an effect unless it is determined by another cause 
and this cause again by another and so on, to infinity” (spinoza, 1996, 
p.21, i p32d). By this moment, I hope that the distinction between the 
metaphysical apparatuses of Lucretius and Spinoza has become more 
discernible. While Lucretius infers the existence of the clinamen by the 
presupposition of a libera voluntas, Spinoza insists that the voluntas, i.e. 
conatus when reflected in the attribute thought, is a causa necessaria that 
is determined to produce an effect by preceding causes ad infinitum. 
This is explained by the fact that in Spinoza’s system only God is a free 
cause (i d7 with i p17), that is, God alone exists from the necessity of his 
substantial nature and acts according to it. 
That is the reason why I think that Morfino’s althusserian inter-
pretation in favor of a rapprochement of Lucretius and Spinoza in terms 
of alea (chance, encounter, randomness) misses the mark entirely.30 I 
pp.114-5).
30  I am referring to his chapter “‘The World by Chance’: On Lucretius and Spino-
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cannot grasp how does he come to the conclusion that “the world is 
by chance” (morfino, 2014, p.87) according to both thinkers and that 
there is a primacy of chance over the necessity in their philosophy after 
having commented a letter from Spinoza and glossing it along these 
lines: “Divine causality excludes happenstance and necessity excludes 
chance.” (morfino, 2014, p.79). 
So God is a cause of itself and every finite mode that exists is 
a necessary effect that expresses God’s power, perfection, and reality in 
a determinate way. As Spinoza writes: “So, all things have been deter-
mined from the necessity of the divine nature, not only to exist, but 
to exist in a certain way and to produce effects in a certain way. There 
is nothing contingent.” (i p29) And when Spinoza says “nothing” he 
really means nothing. Both in respect to the past and to the future (cf. ii 
p44c1), everything that is, follows both logically and causally from the 
necessity of the divine eternal nature. This thesis is an articulation of 
Spinoza’s resolute necessitarian position. In the light of this, it is a defect 
of knowledge, a misconception of the imagination31 that makes us con-
sider events as contingent. For reason, as Spinoza famously argues, has 
the peculiarity of regarding things as necessary and as necessarily true, 
without connection whatsoever to temporal duration, but rather “un-
der a certain species of eternity”32 [sub quadam aeternitatis specie]. In this 
za,” in his book Plural Temporality: Transindividuality and the Aleatory Between Spinoza and 
Althusser (morfino, 2014, pp.72-88).
31  “Imagination” in the technical sense that is has in Spinoza: “When the human 
mind regards external bodies through ideas of the affections of its own body, then we 
say that it imagines” (spinoza, 1996, p.50, ii, P26CorD).
32  That is, eternal not because it is everlasting (stretching infinitely to past and 
future) but because it is timeless, i.e., outside of the temporal structure, just as one 
might say that the adequate definition of a circle does not pertain to time because it 
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respect, “imagining a thing as free can be nothing but simply imagining 
it while we are ignorant of the causes by which it has been determined 
to act” (spinoza, 1996, pp.164-5, v p5d). Considering this, for Spinoza, 
the clinamen should amount to nothing but an inadequate idea, arising 
from a fallacious reasoning that departs from the affections of the body 
to reach its conclusion. It would then be a knowledge of the first kind 
(imagination), rather than of the second (reason) or the third kind (in-
tuitive knowledge), according to the classification offered in ii p40s2. 
This discrepancy between both authors is partially explained by 
the fact that Lucretius makes a distinction between animated and unan-
imated creatures to advance the thesis of the clinamen. It is the posses-
sion of voluntas or a volitional power that is to a certain extent libera or 
unhindered, in the sense of not being thoroughly determined – causally 
and logically –, which stipulates that the clinamen must take place to 
fracture the decrees of fate. This form of explanation which institutes 
a “kingdom within a kingdom” wouldn’t be welcomed by Spinoza. In 
his reasoning, God, the mind, human action, animals, things, and appe-
tites are treated “just as if it were a question of lines, planes and bodies.” 
(spinoza, 1996, p.69, iii Preface), with the same claim of necessary and 
extratemporal truth that a geometrical definition has. Lucretius’ model 
in De Rerum Natura, on the other hand, is more atomic or physical than 
mathematical or geometrical.33
In connection with this, Spinoza’s “necessitarianism” is a thesis 
much stronger than determinism, for it holds that the laws of nature 
is necessarily true by its own logical definition. 
33  For this reason, it has already been argued that Spinoza’s Ethics can only be a 
“descriptive ethics”, and not a “prescriptive ethics.” See russell, 1984. 
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and all states of affairs could not have been in any way otherwise.34 It is 
precisely this sort of theoretical perspective that Lucretius would want 
to deny and that made Epicurus propose that it is better to believe in 
the popular mythology regarding the Gods than to believe in such an 
inexorable necessary order. But if “all things follow from God’s eternal 
decree with the same necessity as from the essence of a triangle it fol-
lows that its three angles are equal to two right angles” (spinoza, 1996, 
p.68, ii p49s), does Spinoza falls prey to the fatalist menace that Epicurus 
and Lucretius were trying to avert? I suppose that the answer to this 
would have to be “not necessarily”.
In some respect, it must be conceded that despite Spinoza’s ne-
cessitarian metaphysics, human beings engage in goal-directed actions 
since they cannot grasp in full the logical and causal concatenation that 
necessarily follows from the nature of God. They deliberate about the 
future and aspire to achieve external objects, given that they have inad-
equate knowledge of the “infinite many things in infinite many modes” 
(spinoza, 1996, p.13, i p16d) that issue from the divine substance.35 In 
this sense, they may fail to reach the reason’s standard of eternity. Besides, 
one could argue that this lofty requirement of reason specifies “God’s 
34  “The laws of nature are necessary, according to determinism, but the particular 
series of events governed by these laws is not necessary: there could have been a differ-
ent series of events. The view that there is more than one possible series of events (or, 
in Spinozistic terms, one possible series of finite modes) is precisely what determinism 
allows and necessitarianism denies.” (della rocca, 2008, p.75-6). Also, see Garrett, 
1991 for a defense of Spinoza’s necessitarianism against readings that try to tone down 
his commitment to it. 
35  For a version of this argument, see Lin, 2006. Also, Garrett, 1990 is a good re-
source to make sense of the tensions within the Ethics between some sort of agency 
and a full-blown necessitarianism. 
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point of view” which humans qua finite modes should aspire to, but 
without ever being completely up to the task, as even Spinoza did not 
consistently abide by it (cf. della rocca, 2010).
Furthermore, just as human beings qua finite modes should 
be read as “quasi-substance”, one can defend that they may achieve a 
“semi-freedom,” i.e., an approximation to the freedom of the divine 
substance which exists and acts exclusively by the necessity of its na-
ture (cf. i d7). In short, to be self-determined by the necessity of one’s 
own nature is to be “free” and this means to act in accordance with 
reason.36 However, one should bear in mind the important caveat that – 
by Spinoza’s criterion – only God can be absolutely free, unequivocally 
self-determined and entirely independent of external causes.37
Hence, a human subject can be called “free” only in a limited 
sense, i.e., insofar as his activity flows – as much as possible – from the 
necessity of his essence as conatus – from within, rather than from out-
side causes. If the nature of a person is an adequate cause,38 and a source 
36  Spinoza offers us a very important passage that speaks to the relation between 
reason and conatus. I quote it: “Since reason demands nothing contrary to nature, it 
demands that everyone loves himself, seek his own advantage, what is really useful to 
him, want what will really lead man to a greater perfection, and absolutely, that every-
one should strive to preserve his own being as far as he can [quantum in se est, conservare 
conetur]. This, indeed, is a necessarily true as that the whole is greater than its parts.” 
(spinoza, 1996, p.125, iv p18s). 
37  As Garrett explains it, “free man” in Spinoza is an idealized limiting case: “the 
concept of the free man is the concept of a limit that can be approached but not com-
pletely attained by finite human beings.” (garrett, 1990, p.231). 
38  “I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived 
through it. But I call it partial, or inadequate, if its effect cannot be understood through 
it alone.” (spinoza, 1996, p.69, iii d1). Causation and conceivability are deeply inter-
woven in Spinoza’s rationalist philosophy. 
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of intelligibility of the effects that proceed from him, then this person 
can be called “free” for he is active in his “actions” under the guidance 
of reason, instead of being passive in his “re-action,” under the servitude 
of passions (in accord with iii d2 and d3). In this sense, a person may 
become “free,” virtuous and powerful (cf. iv d8). 
The power of passions is a power alien to the conatus that defines 
the singular, actual essence of each subject (cf. iv p5d), compelling it to 
“react” according to a foreign demand which does not proceed from the 
laws of its own nature. But the power of reason makes us regard events 
as necessary and abide by our own conatus as the fundamental ground of 
causality and intelligibility of our activity. In this respect, the conatus qua 
actual essence of human subjects would inevitably dissipate the threat 
of apraxia that the “idle argument” puts forward, as it promotes not only 
a self-preserving but also a self-perfecting inclination, prompting indi-
viduals to increase their power of action. In summary, Spinoza advocates 
for a praxis of reason as the expression of a human, finite freedom against 
the pathos of affects understood as a pathology of servitude. 
From his own conceptual resources, then, Spinoza apparently 
can invalidate the fatalist disposition and refute the “idle argument.” 
Nonetheless, the differences between his metaphysics and that of Ep-
icurus’/Lucretius’ remains substantial. A balance between the notions 
of clinamen and conatus that served as the red thread of our argument is 
adumbrated in the way of conclusion. 
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conclusion 
Spinoza seems to have had some acquaintance with Lucretius 
and the atomistic tradition. In a sequence of letters exchanged with 
Hugo Boxel over the existence or non-existence of ghosts, specters 
and the like (spinoza, 2016, Letters 51 to 56), Spinoza contrasts the 
philosophical lineage composed by Plato, Aristotle and Socrates to one 
formed by Epicurus, Democritus and Lucretius (spinoza, 2016, Letter 
56, p.423). Against Boxel who was invoking the authority of various 
ancient philosophers to support the existence of spirits (cf. spinoza, 
2016, Letter 55, p.420), Spinoza declares that it is not surprising that 
Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates could have believed in ghostlike entities, 
as they devised such notions such as “occult qualities,” “intentional spe-
cies”, “substantial forms” and “a thousand of other trifles”. It would be 
a matter of wonder, however, if Democritus and the atomists believed in 
such spectral beings.39 From this passage, it can be assumed that Spinoza 
had at least some knowledge about Lucretius and the atomist tradition, 
to the point of holding them in high regard, higher even than the phil-
osophical holy trinity composed by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 
As I hope to have demonstrated with my paper, the metaphysical 
machinery in operation in Lucretius and Spinoza is so incongruent, that 
39  I will quote the entire passage as it is of remarkable interest. “To me the authority 
of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates is not worth much. I would have been amazed if you 
had mentioned Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius, or any of the Atomists, or defenders 
of invisible particles. But it’s no wonder that the people who invented occult qualities, 
intentional species, substantial forms, and a thousand other trifles contrived ghosts 
and spirits, and believed old wives’ tales, to lessen the authority of Democritus, whose 
good reputation they so envied that they had all his books burned, which he had pub-
lished with such great praise.” (spinoza, 2016, Letter 56, p.423). 
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the terms themselves – clinamen and conatus – come out as discordant. 
The roles that are assigned to freedom and necessity are sharply con-
trasted. As a result, the difference between clinamen and conatus comes 
about not simply from the conceptual definition of each term, but much 
more deeply from the sheer distinction between the metaphysical appa-
ratuses that Lucretius and Spinoza put together. To make things clearer, I 
will collate the conflicting points of each philosophical doctrine below: 
(a1) Clinamen: Occurs in an unidentifiable moment in space and time 
(DRN ii.259-60; 293) taking an atomico-physical pattern of explana-
tion.
(a2) Conatus: Involves an indefinite time (iii p8) which is instantiated by 
each singular and finite thing, taking the model of a mathematico-geo-
metrical definition.
(b1) Clinamen: Allow us to be morally accountable (cf. diogenes of oe-
noanda; fr. 32, 1.14-3.14).
(b2) Conatus: Is a source of creation of values (cf.  iii p9).
(c1) Clinamen: Presupposes and somehow justifies libera voluntas.
(c2) Conatus: Serves to explain and refute the idea of libera voluntas.
(d1) Clinamen: As a physical phenomenon, breaks with determinism 
(logical, causal or both) to make room for human agency and rational 
deliberation. 
(d2) Conatus: As a logical definition and ontological foundation, estab-
lishes the necessary cause through which human activity can be, to a 
certain degree, deemed as “free.”
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(e1) Clinamen: An action is considered to be “free” if it somehow breaks 
with the rule of fate and does not proceed by necessity from causes after 
cause ad infinitum.
(e2) Conatus: An action is considered to be “free” if and only if it follows 
adequately from the necessity of a things’ own nature and is not com-
pelled by external causes (i d8).
With this, I hope to have shown against Deleuze and some con-
temporary authors that followed his lead, that clinamen and conatus are 
almost incommensurable notions and pertain to divergent metaphysical 
systems. Although I can understand Deleuze’s perspective in devising 
such an approximation between the two notions as an attempt to de-
fend the clinamen against such longstanding refutation, as one finds from 
Cicero onwards, that considers the clinamen to be the manifestation of a 
motion without a cause, I believe that this conflation is misleading rath-
er than illuminating. Additionally, I hope that by reconsidering some of 
the problems that Epicurus and Lucretius were facing and by reading 
them into Spinoza’s philosophy, some fresh light could be drawn on the 
tensions between human agency and the necessitarian framework from 
his Ethics. 
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LUCRETIUS AND SPINOZA OR CLINAMEN AND CONATUS
abstract: This paper compares and contrasts two philosophical con-
cepts that stem from different lineages of thought: on the one hand, 
Lucretius’ clinamen; on the other, Spinoza’s conatus. What has motivated 
my research for this paper is a conflation between these two notions 
as suggested by Deleuze in the appendix to his Logique du sens. In this 
regard, the first section is oriented towards an elucidation of Lucretius’ 
philosophy – consequently, of Epicurus’ as well –and, specifically, of his 
view about the swerve of atoms, or clinamen, combined with the sub-
ject of freedom. The second section is dedicated to clarifying Spinoza’s 
metaphysics and the accommodation of the theme of freedom within 
his robust necessitarian framework, interwoven with the motif of co-
natus, or self-preserving striving. Against Deleuze’s reading, however, I 
argue that clinamen and conatus belong to metaphysical systems that are 
quite incompatible and that they support different understandings of 
both freedom and necessity.  
key-words: Lucretius, Spinoza, clinamen, conatus, freedom, necessity.
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